International Economic Law by Andreas Lowenfeld (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 824 Pages (Softcover). Price US$45.00. ISBN: 0 199264112 by Friedman, Elliot
  
BOOK REVIEW   
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW BY 
ANDREAS LOWENFELD (NEW YORK: OXFORD 
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2003) 824 PAGES 
(SOFTCOVER). PRICE US$45.00.              
ISBN: 0 199264112  
 
 
ELLIOT FRIEDMAN* 
 
Andreas Lowenfeld, Herbert and Rose Rubin Professor of International Economic 
Law at New York University School of Law, notes in the acknowledgement page to 
International Economic Law that the editors of Oxford University Press approached 
him to write a ‘treatise on International Economic Law’.1  This statement is slightly 
misleading.  Although Lowenfeld addresses a great number of areas coming under 
the general umbrella of international economic law, his work is not an exhaustive 
treatment of the entire subject.  As he notes in the introduction, ‘the book is de-
signed not primarily as a work of reference but rather as an integrated whole.’2  
Indeed, it is doubtful whether any one author possesses the necessary expertise to 
deal comprehensively with the entire corpus of international economic law, regulat-
ing as it does areas as broad-ranging as, for example, goods, intellectual property, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, antidumping and investment.3   
 
While Lowenfeld’s book is informed by a sense of optimism as to the Rule of 
Law’s triumph in the economic sphere – recounting that states are relatively more 
                                                        
*
 LLM Candidate, Harvard Law School. 
 
1
 Andreas Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (2002) viii. 
2
 Ibid vii.  
3
 See J H H Weiler, ‘The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and 
External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2001) 35 Journal of World Trade 191: ‘it is becom-
ing increasingly difficult (though some still make the claim) to be a true specialist in all areas of substan-
tive law covered by the agreements.’ 
 796   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 9 NO 2 
 
compliant with international economic norms than other norms of international law4 
– he chooses not to address the arguably more fundamental challenges to the inter-
national economic system – that for increasing numbers (including state parties), 
the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) has come to represent the harmful aspects 
of globalisation and the triumph of the agenda of wealthy nations.  One need only 
look to the failed Ministerial Conferences in Seattle (1999) and Cancun (2003), as 
well as the ongoing anti-globalisation protests, to grasp the profound importance of 
this issue.  However, it is not Lowenfeld’s (express) intention to convert, apologise 
or rationalise: he states quite clearly in the preface that ‘this book seeks to teach, not 
to preach’.5  And teach it does.  
 
Running through the entire book is Lowefeld’s ability to present complex and 
technical concepts in a form that is concise, elegant and, above all else, interesting.  
The book bristles with minute historical and legal detail, but at no stage does the 
content become tedious.  Lowenfeld succeeds in placing the reader at the heart of 
the action, which is not surprising given the author’s long involvement in matters of 
international economic law, as academic, US State Department lawyer, and frequent 
arbitrator in international commercial disputes. 
 
International Economic Law is not a traditional ‘black letter law’ reference text; it 
will only rarely be of assistance is answering the question ‘What is the current law 
on X?’.  Instead, its value lies in demonstrating the evolution of international eco-
nomic law; in tracing the development of regulatory ideas and desires, placing them 
in their historical and political settings, and presenting the resulting international 
agreement.  It is this sense of history and context that makes Lowenfeld’s book such 
a worthwhile and useful publication, especially for newcomers to the field.   
 
Turning to the content of the book, the majority of chapters deal with the interna-
tional law of international trade, with chapters also devoted to the international law 
of private foreign investment, the international monetary system, and what 
Lowenfeld describes as ‘Economic Controls for Political Ends’ (ie the use of eco-
nomic sanctions).  The book is divided into eight parts, only a few of which can, 
due to the constraints of space, be discussed in this review.   
 
Part I, ‘International Economic Law’, provides a brief but illuminating background 
to the laws of economics relating to international trade and money flows.  
Lowenfeld provides readers, many of whom will lack a background in economics, 
with enough information to grasp the underlying context and concepts of interna-
tional economic law, without delving too deeply into technical detail that often 
alienates rather than enlightens the uninitiated.   
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Part II provides a general background to the legal and institutional framework 
created by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’) and the WTO 
and its attendant Agreements.  The four chapters in Part II deal with the origins of 
the GATT (Chapter 3), the Evolution of the GATT and GATT law (Chapter 4), the 
results of the Uruguay Round of negotiations (Chapter 5), and the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (Chapter 6).   
 
Part II begins with an instructive overview of the rationale and content of the 
GATT.  Here Lowenfeld sets the stage for the coming chapters.  He starts by pre-
senting the basic and continuing assumptions underlying the GATT: that trade 
across national frontiers is to be encouraged and government intervention is to be 
limited.6  Lowenfeld then outlines the foundational principles of the GATT, includ-
ing universal most favoured nation (duties and other charges on imported goods 
apply equally to all contracting parties), national treatment (non-discrimination 
against imported goods), the commitment not to increase trade barriers, and the 
acceptance of tariffs as the only legitimate trade restraint.  Recognising that these 
principles are often not determinative of outcomes, Lowenfeld also undertakes a 
brief analysis of their qualifications, including national security, the regime of 
general exceptions, and custom unions and free trade areas.  
 
Lowenfeld then tracks the progress of trade negotiations through the Kennedy and 
Tokyo Rounds to the Uruguay Round.  Lowenfeld does not downplay the impor-
tance of the Uruguay Round in broadening the scope of the rules and institutions of 
international trade law, and rightly so.  He states: 
 
In some ways the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the establishment 
of the World Trade Organization constitute a new start for the international 
law of international trade.7   
 
However, faithful to his evolutionary approach to international economic law, 
Lowenfeld continues: 
 
But there is no doubt that the WTO is a continuation of the GATT system, 
a ratification and formalization of close to fifty years of development of 
rules of an institution – written and customary – and of attitudes of the par-
ticipating states.8 
 
 
The reader is then presented with an insightful analysis of the achievements of the 
Uruguay Round.  Some agreements, such as the Anti-Dumping Code and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, are given brief treatment, to 
be expanded upon later in the book.  Other important agreements, such as the 
Agreement on Safeguards and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
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Rights (‘TRIPs’) Agreement, are examined only briefly (and do not surface again in 
any meaningful way).  This is especially disappointing in the case of the TRIPs 
Agreement.  The TRIPs Agreement, probably more than any other trade agreement, 
demands sweeping changes and, in some cases, additions to domestic laws and 
regulations,9 and has been the subject of persistent criticism on the basis of its 
alleged inimical effects on the economic and social interests of developing coun-
tries.10  Unfortunately, Lowenfeld devotes little time to these issues, merely noting 
them, and concludes in typical cutting style: 
 
An unspoken element of the “package deal” that became the Uruguay 
Round was that greater access for goods of the developing countries in de-
veloped country markets must be accompanied by greater protection of in-
tellectual property in the developing countries.11  
 
 
Part III, ‘Dispute Resolution’, covers dispute resolution in the GATT (1948-1994) 
and, subsequently, in the WTO.  Lowenfeld traces the movement from diplomatic 
settlement of trade disputes under the GATT to a focus on ‘judicialisation’ and 
adjudication under the WTO’s Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes (‘DSU’).  He concludes that when the members of the 
WTO adopted the DSU, they ‘committed themselves to a system in which the rights 
and obligations were to be matched by an equally comprehensive system of reme-
dies.’12    
 
Seeping ominously through his treatment of dispute settlement under the WTO is 
the ‘section 301 remedy’, a section (or, more accurately, a number of sections) of 
US trade legislation that permit unilateral retaliation on the part of the US Govern-
ment for perceived breaches of international trade rules.  Clearly, a reversion to 
unilateral retaliation will undermine the compulsory dispute settlement procedures 
established in the DSU.  After a concise and illuminating exposition of the opera-
tion of section 301 remedies, Lowenfeld argues persuasively that the DSU has been 
successful in inducing state parties – most notably the US – to move from a unilat-
eral to multilateral approach to the resolution of trade disputes.  In support of this 
thesis Lowenfeld draws on the Kodak-Fuji case between the US and Japan, which 
saw the US resort to the DSU almost immediately following its introduction.13   
 
In order to present ‘a realistic appraisal of the WTO dispute settlement system’,14 
Lowenfeld also turns to the long-running dispute between the US and the EU over 
EU subsidies to banana growers, which saw the US perilously close to reverting to 
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unilateral trade measures.  Here Lowenfeld again displays his gift for presenting 
factually and legally complex issues clearly and elegantly.  For Lowenfeld, what-
ever does not kill the DSU makes it stronger, and the fact that unilateralism in the 
bananas dispute was avoided is testimony to the substantial contribution made by 
the DSU to the compliance framework of international economic obligations.  
 
Part IV, ‘The Rules of International Trade in Detail’, is the closest this book gets to 
a traditional reference work.  Lowenfeld deals in detail with the regulation of subsi-
dies and countervailing measures (chapter 9) and dumping and anti-dumping (chap-
ter 10).  Part V, ‘Beyond the World Trade Organization’, deals with two ‘trade and 
…’ issues: trade and the environment (chapter 11) and trade and competition law 
(chapter 1215).  Both are extremely comprehensive chapters, highlighted by 
Lowenfeld’s masterly yet concise analysis of the Tuna/Dolphin and Shrimp/Turtle 
cases, both of which run to hundreds of pages in the reports.   
 
The greatest contribution of the book (in this author’s opinion), and the last to be 
discussed in this review, comes in Part VI, ‘International Investment’.  Here, 
Lowenfeld takes a central theme – the responsibility of host states to foreign inves-
tors – and examines its position at customary international law, its treatment in 
domestic and international courts and tribunals, and the impact of case- and re-
gional-specific agreements.   
 
The underlying principles governing the international law of international invest-
ment are that aliens are entitled to at least equality of treatment with nationals of the 
host state, and that a state is obliged to pay compensation in the event of an expro-
priation of property belonging to an alien.  It is primarily the customary interna-
tional law of state responsibility for expropriations that regulates the treatment of 
international investment, and it is in this area that Lowenfeld seems most at home.  
His analysis begins with a brief statement of the law prior to World War I, then 
considers the breakdown of principles of state responsibility during the Russian and 
Mexican revolutions, moves through the ‘classical Western view’ that urges com-
pensation upon expropriation to be ‘adequate, effective and prompt’, notes the 
undermining of these principles during the massive wave of expropriations between 
1945 and 1970, and rounds out the analysis with a thoughtful summary of the 
contributions made by contemporary international tribunals.  
 
In the final chapter on international investment, ‘Evolving Standards of Interna-
tional Law on International Investment’, Lowenfeld considers the ‘new devices’ 
regulating international investment, including bilateral investment treaties, invest-
ment guarantees and the ICSID dispute settlement facility.  The emerging signifi-
cance of these ‘new devices’ cannot be underestimated.  Two obvious reasons come 
to mind.  First, since the failure of the Cancun Ministerial, the US has vowed to 
move ahead in the direction of bilateral and regional trade agreements, and the EU 
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has also considered giving greater priority to such arrangements.16  In the Asian-
Pacific region alone, Australia has recently signed bilateral agreements with Singa-
pore, Thailand and the US, is negotiating with China and Malaysia, and agreements 
are now being developed in Asia to link Japan, South Korea and China and the 
ASEAN economies in various combinations.   
 
Second, investor protection provisions in all bilateral investment treaties, and many 
free trade agreements, provide investors with an automatic arbitral forum for the 
settlement of investment disputes with host states (without relying, as is tradition-
ally the case in international law, for a home state to adopt the investor’s claim).  
The provision of investor-state arbitration has aroused much sentiment, especially 
in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement, where it has been 
described on the one hand as a ‘most innovative feature’, and, on the other, as a 
‘fast track attack on American values’, an ‘end-run around the Constitution’ and as 
‘shockingly unsuited to the task of balancing private rights against public goods.’17   
 
Lowenfeld does not enter the fray.  Instead he presents the main provisions com-
mon to most investment agreements: obligations surrounding the admission of 
foreign investment; fair and equitable treatment; full protection and security; and 
compensation in the case of expropriation.  Lowenfeld helpfully examines the case 
law dealing with the concept of expropriation, the difference between expropriation 
and the mere exercise of regulatory or police powers, and the vexing issue of the 
amount of compensation due following an expropriation.  Given the current frag-
mented state of the law,18 it is understandable that Lowenfeld does not reach any 
firm conclusions on these questions, although his guidance and analysis of the 
jurisprudence is invaluable. However, in one of the book’s highlights, Lowenfeld 
outlines a fairly convincing case for bilateral investment treaties having reached the 
status of customary international law.  He writes: 
 
a fair inference might be drawn that, taken together, the Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties are now evidence of customary international law, applicable 
even when a given situation or controversy is not explicitly governed by a 
treaty.19 
 
Lowenfeld states his (controversial) case tentatively, finishing with the remark that 
‘the debate need not be answered conclusively.’20  In a subsequent and wonderfully 
provocative article, however, Lowenfeld is more forthright, suggesting  
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that the mass of almost identical bilateral investment treaties constitutes in-
ternational legislation, though it does not quite fit the traditional classifica-
tion of international law into two categories – customary law and treaty 
law.21 
 
Lowenfeld continues persuasively that 
 
the BIT movement has moved beyond lex specialis (or better, leges spe-
cialis) to the level of customary law effective even for non-signatories.  
This conclusion may be inconsistent with the traditional definition of cus-
tomary law … My suggestion is that perhaps the traditional definition of 
customary law is wrong, or at least in this area, incomplete.22  
 
 
International Economic Law is a valuable book.  Its strength lies in its ability to 
present complicated and dense political, historical and legal detail in an informative 
and easily digestible form.  Lowenfeld notes in the ‘Afterword’ that he has chosen 
not to approach the subject normatively, but rather to emphasise the process of 
international economic law, believing that ‘the answers cannot be understood with-
out the questions’.  This lack of ‘black letter’ content may, however, prevent the 
book from reaching the reading lists of law school classes. This would be a shame.  
For Lowenfeld’s book belongs, to borrow a phrase, in the ‘innermost circle of 
books’,23 in addition to conveying its message it is a pleasure to read.  
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